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Abstract 
This paper has four main objectives: (1) to monitor the rise of poverty and income inequality 
during the first decade of Russian transition; (2) to analyze the performance of the welfare 
state in reducing poverty and income inequality; (3) to identify the most vulnerable groups of 
transition; and (4) to elucidate the changes occurring in the social structure in terms of wage 
and income differences. The empirical evidences provided in the paper lead to the conclusion 
that the impact of the Russian welfare state has been rather limited with welfare institutions 
having only marginally succeeded in reducing poverty among people in need. This study has 
also highlighted how the Russian society is now slowly acquiring those characteristics of 
differentiation present in Western societies, which for so many years had been advocated by 
the population. Unfortunately, differentiation in wages has also implied a dramatic and 
excessive differentiation in life standards and opportunities. These are all challenges that the 
Russian welfare state is called to deal with. The individualization and monetarization of risks 
are, in fact, accentuating the self-perpetuating character of poverty, especially for children, 
elderly, large families with children, single mothers, farmers, manual workers, unemployed 
and social assistance beneficiaries. 
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Introduction 
In 1985, the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as new General Secretary of the Communist 
party signaled the beginning of a new political course for Russia, for Europe and for the entire 
world. Gorbachev’s new political directions, Glasnost (literally “openness”) and Perestrojka 
(literally “[economic] rebuilding”), opened the doors to a new wave of democratization in the 
region. For the people of Russia (and for all other Eastern European citizens who were living 
under the communist regime), “openness” in the political sphere and “restructuring” of the 
central planned economy did not automatically coincide with an improvement of their living 
conditions. Painful macro-economic stabilization measures coupled to a fast privatization of 
obsolete state-owned enterprises also worsened an already poor situation. Immediately after 
the first years of transition, GDP drastically fell, while unemployment (until that day an 
unknown problem) dramatically increased. In particular, during the first decade of transition, 
the Real GDP Growth of the Russian Federation dropped from a base of 100 in 1989 to 59 in 
2000 (Unicef 2003). By contrast, the number of registered unemployed increased from 5.2 per 
cent in 1992 to 9.8 in 2000 (ILO Laborsta 2004). This negative economic performance also 
accompanied an increase in poverty and income inequality. The Gini coefficient increased 
from 0.393 in 1992 to 0.434 in 2000, while the number of poor people in the year 2000 
reached 25 per cent of total population (LIS Key Figures 2005).  
 
Unquestionably, this rise of poverty and income inequality represents a shadow on the 
sustainability of future reforms. For Offe (1994) and Rüb (1996), in fact, new democratic 
rules cannot be simply introduced by design, instead they must be institutionalized and shared 
by the community according to the principles agreed in advance with the citizens (the so-often 
quoted “social contract”). The risk is, as Adam Przeworski (1991) has correctly emphasized, 
that those citizens who have been economically disadvantaged by the restructuring of the 
Russian economy (such as unemployed, pensioners and workers of ex state-owned 
enterprises) might oppose or block further reforms. In this context, the social security system 
is called to play a crucial role in the process of democratic stabilization, helping to confer a 
moral legitimacy to the transformation towards a capitalist-based society and facilitating the 
creation of a new consensus around the new democratic rules (Cerami 2003, 2006a, 2006b). 
For these reasons, monitoring the performance of the Russian welfare state remains, fifteen 
years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, a crucial issue for the democratic stability of the 
European region. 
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This paper has four main objectives: (1) to monitor the rise of poverty and income inequality 
during the first decade of transition; (2) to analyze the performance of the Russian welfare 
state in reducing poverty and income inequality; (3) to identify the most vulnerable groups of 
transition; and (4) to elucidate the changes occurring in the social structure in terms of wage 
and income differences. The main hypothesis of this research is simple, but also extremely 
worrying in that it can be argued that the individualization and monetarization of risks2 in 
times of market failures is, on the one hand, resulting in a drastic increase in social inequality 
with a different impact according to the position that people retain in the social structure, 
while, on the other, it is decreasing the effectiveness of the welfare state for the most 
vulnerable groups of transition. Thus, one should expect to find higher poverty rates, but also 
a less efficient welfare state, for the people more in need.  
  
In order to examine these aims and to find a response to the main question of whether the 
residual welfare state introduced in the last decade to the new Russia is effective or not in 
tackling poverty and income inequality, an in-depth analysis on the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) has been carried out. The LIS dataset is a collection of household income 
surveys, which provide demographic, income and expenditure information on three different 
levels: household, person and child. The three datasets involved in this study concern Russia 
during the period 1992, 1995 and 2000. These datasets are based on the answers from more 
than 3000 households. For the purpose of this investigation, the analysis has been carried out 
on the household, as well as on the person level. In other words, not only the overall 
household income has been taken into account, but also the single income. In general, 
calculations include the Gini coefficient and poverty rates, calculated as 60 per cent of the 
median average income of the population, on the net disposable income and on the net 
disposable income minus social transfers. The purpose has been to see to what extent the 
absence of social transfers would affect social inequality, as well as trying to understand how 
resources (inputs) were turned into results (outputs).  
 
Social Structure, Poverty and Income Inequality in Russia 
Russian economic transition has not only meant the transition towards a more democratic  
society, but it is also resulted in a social catastrophe with rise of poverty, infectious diseases, 
mortality, divorce rates, children in alternative care, drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, and 
homelessness (Manning and Tikhonova 2004, pp.12-17). In order to describe the unexpected 
                                                 
2 The term "monetarization" has been introduced by Frank Ettrich to whom I owe a huge debt for valuable 
discussion on this topic. 
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negative consequences of Gorbachev’s Perestrojka, these dramatic social changes have been 
defined by Zinoviev as “Katastrojka” (quoted in Field and Twigg 2000, p.5), a term that 
gives a clear picture of the severe “human crisis” (Manning and Tikhonova 2004) occurring in 
the post-communist Russia. The rise of poverty has also coincided with the formation of 
specific poverty sub-cultures. The new poor consist of large sections of skilled specialists and 
blue-collar workers, who often have second vocational or even higher education, are middle-
aged or elderly and, prior to reforms, belonged to the best-off strata among the population 
(Manning and Tikhonova 2004, p.20; 34; see also Manning, Shkaratan and Tikhonova 2000; 
Simonia 2003). Unsurprisingly, the first “socially excluded” Russians have been identified in 
those who do not have a residence permit and, hence, do not have access to the welfare state 
(Manning and Tikhonova 2004, p.22). In this context, ethnic segregation (Mickiewicz 1991), 
such as in the case of people coming from Chechnya, becomes a determinant factor of poverty 
(Zdravomyslov and Tsutsiev 2004). Nonetheless, other social groups, among which children 
(Unicef 2004), women (Klingman 1994; Manning and Tikhonova 2004; Davidova and 
Tikhonova 2004),  disabled (Dunn 2000) and pensioners (Velkoff and Kinselle 2000) can also 
now be included into the context of extreme poverty.   
 
An important issue that needs a special focus concerns the health situation of Russian citizens, 
which has dramatically worsened in recent years. Just to quote few examples, life expectancy 
at birth decreased from 64 years for men and 75 for women in 1989 to 59 for men and 72 for 
women in 2003. The standard death rate, by contrast, increased from 1162 per 100,000 
citizens in 1989 to 1568 in 2003. Similar dramatic increases concern the diseases of the 
circulatory system from 664 per 100,000 citizens in 1989 to 871 in 2003, as well as the 
number of deaths due to AIDS from 107 in 1999 to 632 in 2003 (WHO 2005 Health for All 
Mortality Database). This list could, unfortunately, continue for pages. Moreover, as Twigg 
(2000) noted, the lack of funds has severely hindered the state’s ability to tackle even the most 
pressing health concerns and Russians citizens now show greater anxiety for becoming ill due 
to the impossibility of paying the doctors (Brown and Rusinova 2000). In this context, it is no 
exaggeration to state, as Powell (2000) has affirmed with regard to the HIV/AIDS problem in 
the region, that this dramatic health deterioration of the Russian society represents a form of 
“self-induced genocide” caused by a chronic lack of funds. 
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Empirical Evidences from LIS 
Figure 1 shows the poverty rates for the total population, children and elderly. As it can be 
seen, the poverty rate for the total population has remained almost stable during the first 
decade of transition, showing no sign of improvement. It was 26.0% in 1992, 25.7% in 1995 
and 25.6% in 2000. Children, by contrast, have seen their situation worsening. The child 
poverty rate increased from 23.6% in 1992, to 28.8% in 1995 to 28.9% in 2000. The elderly 
are one of the groups of citizens who suffered most from the collapse of communism, 
especially in the first years following the dissolution of communism. The elderly poverty rate 
reached 49.3% in 1992, but then decreased up to 26.7% in 1995 and to 24.2% in 2000 (see 
also Table 1 in the appendix).  
 
Fig. 1 Poverty Rates in Russia 
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Figure 2 shows the poverty rate for disabled people calculated on net disposable income (DPI) 
and on the sole revenues coming from the market (market income, MI3). Such an analysis was 
necessary, since disabled people in the post-communist Russia are isolated and the handicap 
problem still tends to be misunderstood by the government. Dunn (2000, p.153-154) quotes, 
for instance, that approximately 30% of handicapped never leave their homes or apartments, 
that only 45.8% have necessary minimum of clothing and that only 40% have TVs and radios. 
As it is illustrated by the figure below, disabled people must heavily rely on state help for 
their sustenance, particularly crucial in recent years (1995 and 2000). At the same time, 
people with handicap have seen their chances to rely solely on the revenues from the market 
greatly reduced. The poverty rate on net disposable income, which was 45.8% in 1992, 
decreased to 28.6% in 1995, but it witnessed a significant raise in 2000 when reached 34.0%. 
If disabled people should only count on the revenues they succeed to earn in the market, the 
                                                 
3 Please note that in the LIS database no information on disability benefits exists. Therefore, it is preferred to 
calculate the poverty rate on the sole market income, instead of trying to subtract social transfers as it has been 
done in the next paragraphs.  This method also neutralizes the possible effect of income taxes.    
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poverty rate would be much higher. It would be 50.4% in 1992, 57.5% in 1995, and 60.8% in 
2000.  
 
Fig. 2 Poverty Rate Disabled People DPI and MI
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The number of children present in a family greatly determines its poverty status. Larger 
families in Russia  (with three or more children) are, in fact, more likely to fall into poverty 
than small families (1-2 children). As Figure 3 shows, the poverty rate of small families rose 
from 20.4% in 1992, to 26.0% in 1995, and to 27.4% in 2000. The poverty rate for larger 
families, by contrast, jumped from 35.2% in 1992, to 43.6% in 1995, while slightly decreased 
in 2000 to 38.6%.    
 
Fig. 3 Poverty Rate Families 
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As mentioned above, one of the most dramatic emergences subsequent to the collapse of 
communism has been a drastic increase in the number of poor elderly. Every tourist that goes 
to Moscow or St. Petersburg cannot avoid the huge number of old man and women selling 
products in front of the undergrounds. For this reason, closed to the general elderly poverty 
rate provided in Figure 1, a more in depth analysis on single households headed by the elderly 
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has been carried out. In particular, Figure 4 focuses on the gender dimension of poverty 
among elderly and shows how the poverty rate in single households headed by old women is 
more than twice (almost three time higher in 1995) than the poverty rate of single households 
headed by old men. It is also worth noting that almost the totality (88.8%) of single 
households headed by old women in 1992 were below the poverty line, and that the decrease 
in poverty that occurred in the following years primarily concerned men rather than women. 
The poverty rate of old men living alone decreased from 64.1% in 1992 to 23.8% in 1995 and 
to 20.8% in 2000, whereas the poverty rate of old women living alone was 88.8% in 1992, 
60.4% in 1995, and 49.7% in 2000. 
 
Fig. 4 Poverty Rates  Elderly Single Households 
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Figure 5 shows the poverty rate of single women. In particular, it illustrates that the poverty 
rate of  single women without children has decreased more drastically (from 63.1% in 1992 to 
42.6% in 1995 to 43.0% in 2000) than the poverty rate of single women with children, which, 
in contrast, has remained almost stable over time (from 38.3% in 1992, to 34.5% in 1995 to 
39.1% in 2000) an indicator of the increasing difficulties that single mothers face in the new 
Russia, but also of the relatively diminution of state protection for single mothers. In 1992, 
the poverty rate of single women without children (63.1%) was much higher than the poverty 
rate of single women with children (38.3%), while in subsequent years an equalization of the 
poverty rates has occurred.  
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Fig. 5 Poverty Rate Single Women
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In order to explore the relationship between poverty and labour structure, the ISCO-88 
classifications have been recoded into three main categories: 1) non-manual workers; 2) 
manual workers; and 3) farm workers. Even though, due to insufficient data in the Russian 
LIS datasets, it has not been possible to recode the ISCO-88 occupations into a more complex 
five or seven category scale as proposed by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) in their famous 
study of class mobility in industrial societies The Constant Flux. The basic three-fold 
typology (present, however, in the Erikson and Goldthorpe’s schema as starting point for 
further differentiation) can provide a basic idea of the incidence of poverty in different 
occupational groups. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the largest increase in poverty has occurred 
for workers occupied in the agricultural sector. Here, the poverty rates rose from 29.5% in 
1992 to 51.3% in 1995 and to 51.4% in 2000. In other words, almost half of the households 
headed by a worker in the agricultural sector was below the poverty line. As it might be 
expected, due to the changes in the labour structure subsequent to the collapse of the 
command economy, poverty rates are lowest for non-manual workers (13.1% in 1992; 13.2% 
in 1995; 12.6% in 2000), while a quite different situation concerns the manual workers for 
whom the poverty rate increased from 17.8% in 1992 to 25% in 1995. In 2000, the poverty 
rate decreased to 21.1%, but this still means than more than one-fifth of households headed by 
a manual worker live below the poverty line.    
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Fig. 6 Poverty Rates Labour Structure
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Which is the relationship between the educational level of workers and their wage earnings in 
the new Russia? One of the main accusation leveled at communism was, in fact, that the 
excessive equalization of wages, which did not take into account the different educational 
achievements of individuals, drastically limited the aspirations and, as a consequence, the 
performance of workers (Machonin 1997). People with an elementary school education 
usually earned the same amount of money (or slightly more) than that of high skilled workers 
and professionals. As Figure 6 shows, contrary to what happened in the central planned 
economy, in the new post-communist Russia wage differences are more accentuated with 
people who have obtained higher educational levels now receiving in proportion a higher 
wage. This trend was particularly evident during the first years of transition (1992 and 1995), 
while an equalization of wages towards the bottom seems to be occurring for people with 
medium and high educational levels in recent years. A possible explanation, rather than a 
“return to the past” justification,  is the trend for poor economic performance of the country 
and the subsequent “race to the bottom” of wages, especially in the public sector. In the 
private sector and, particularly for those employees working for foreign companies, wages, in 
fact, tend to be substantially higher.    
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Fig. 7 Average Wage/Education Level (base=100)
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As far as the gender dimension of earnings is concerned, the transition towards a market-
based society has reduced the egalitarian achievement of the socialist Russia. Although often 
neglected by the international literature, the Soviet Union unquestionably belonged to the 
family of dual-breadwinner welfare regimes (see Lewis 1992) with equal opportunities 
between men and women achieved through the same access, rights and payment in the work 
place. Even though some form of segregation continued to persist even during communism 
(Ferge 1997; Paci 2002; Pascall and Manning 2000; Manning 2004; Pascall and Kwak 2005), 
gender equality was seen by communist leaders as an unavoidable moral duty for two main 
reasons: firstly, because it was one of the foundations of the communist doctrine, but, 
secondly, and not less importantly, because it would have been helpful to make a clear 
distinction from the non egalitarian and gender segregating nature of capitalist societies. As 
Figure 8 illustrates the increase in the wage gender gap in Russia immediately after the first 
years of transition, from 1.4 in 1992 to 1.6 in 1995 and 1.5 in 2000. This has been the result of 
several causes, among which the most important are the change in economic structure now 
aligned towards a male-breadwinner model typical of many Western societies and the change 
towards a chauvinist mentality. In absence of the strong state regulation in force during 
communism, the Russian economy has inevitably tended to facilitate the survival of men in a 
difficult labour market. Russian men are, in fact, less subjected, than women, to family duties 
(such as unpaid work at home, or child raising responsibilities) and they have, as a 
consequence, more time for their career (assumed they succeed to maintain their work place). 
In addition, a drastic change in the perception of women is now taking place. If during 
communism, they were seen as revolutionary forces whose efforts for emancipation were 
rewarded, at least in part, by the communist state, in the new market economy women tend to 
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be seen more often as sexual objects (Sperling 2000) and, in general, they are perceived as 
less reliable workers than men.    
  
Fig. 8 Gender Wage Gap
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When concerned with the relationship between average wage and occupation (as previously 
shown in Figure 7) it is important to discover whether the new post-communist Russia is 
witnessing processes of wage differentiation as a reaction to the over-standardization in force 
in the central planned economy, or whether a leveling of incomes and occupation is, in reality, 
taking place. As Figure 9 shows, especially during the first years of transition (1992 and 
1995), farmers have been the occupational group that has seen their earnings drastically 
reduced if compared to manual and non-manual workers, even though these wage differences 
decreased in 2000. A striking element emerging from Figure 9 is also the limited wage 
differences of non-manual and manual workers. After a brief period (between 1992 and 1995) 
during which wage differences were increasing, the average wage of non manual workers in 
2000 is now very closed to the average wage of manual workers. This controversial result can, 
in part, be explained by the poor economic performance of the Russian economy and its 
subsequent race to the bottom of wages, but also by a still inadequate economic structure, 
which seems to display, especially in the public sector, several features of state-socialism.  
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Fig. 9 Average Wage/ Occupation (base=100)
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How much would social inequality increase if no welfare institution would exist? In order to 
respond to this question, the Gini coefficient on net disposable income (DPI) and on net 
disposable income minus social transfers (DPI minus social transfers) is calculated. Although 
Figure 10 shows that income inequality would increase without the existence of social 
transfers, it also shows the limited impact of welfare institutions. Without social transfers, the 
Gini coefficient of the Russian Federation would be only 9% higher in 1992 (from 0.395 to 
0.430), 13% higher in 1995 (from 0.447 to 0.504), and 14% in 2000 (from 0.434 to 0.497) 
(see also Table 10) than originally seen. Needless to say, a stronger involvement of the state 
to reduce differences in income is urgently required, since the market alone does not seem to 
be in the position of responding to the negative effects of transition. 
 
Fig. 10 GINI (DPI minus Social Transfers)
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As far as the poverty rates is concerned, if no social transfers were in place, the percentage of 
total population living below the poverty line would have increased in 1992 from 26.0% to 
32.4%, in 1995 from 25.7% to 36.7% and in 2000 from 25.6% to 36.4%. Although this result 
is certainly remarkable, since it implies a poverty reduction rate of 25% in 1992, of 43% in 
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1995 and of 42% in 2000, it still implies that approximately one-fourth of total population is 
forced to live in poverty (Figure 11; see also Table 11).  
 
Fig. 11 Poverty Rate 
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If compared to other European and non-European countries, the Russian welfare state has one 
of the lowest, although not the lowest, impact in reducing poverty. The percentage of change 
in absence of social transfers is of 42% for the Russian Federation, but it is even below for 
Ireland (-34%) and for the USA (-20%). Nevertheless, without social transfers, less than one-
third of the total population in the United States live below the poverty line (28.6%), while 
this percentage in Russia is much higher, corresponding, as mentioned, to 36.4% (see Table 
12). This is, of course, not to justify the poor performance of American welfare institutions, 
but rather to stress the vital importance of a functioning welfare state in reducing poverty, 
especially for countries characterized by a strong market deficit. As it might be expected, the 
Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway and Sweden) are the most successful in reducing 
poverty and this thanks to a comprehensive and well-developed welfare system, followed by 
the richest Bismarckian (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland), Southern 
European (Greece, Spain and Italy) and Liberal (UK, Ireland and USA) welfare regimes. 
Interestingly, the Central and Eastern European countries, which so often are addressed as 
moving towards the liberal model, display a stronger welfare state in preventing poverty than 
expected. The ratio of change in poverty is of 72% in Estonia, of 149% in Hungary, of 118% 
in Poland and of 105% in Slovenia (see Table 12).  
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Fig. 12 Poverty Rates  Before and After 
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The following figure provides further insights on the impact of the Russian welfare state in 
reducing poverty, but this time, the attention is given to those who receive unemployment 
benefits. As can be seen in Figure 13, the Russian welfare state has diminished its role in 
protecting the unemployed especially in the last years. While at the beginning of 1992, the 
poverty rate of those beneficiaries receiving unemployment benefits (UC) would have 
increased by 60% if no unemployment benefits would have been in place (from 21.0% to 
33.7%), the percentage of poverty reduction decreased to 23% in 1995 (from 24.1% to 
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29.7%), and to 26% in 2000 (from 30.5% to 38.5%). It is also worth noting how the number 
of poor UC beneficiaries has increased overtime. In 1992 approximately 21.0% of UC 
beneficiaries still lived below the poverty line, in 1995 they were 24.1%, and in 2000 they 
reached 30.5% (see also Table 13).   
 
Fig. 13 Poverty Rate among UC Beneficiaries (DPI 
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In order to assess the effectiveness of the Russian family benefit system, the poverty rate 
among family benefit (FB) beneficiaries is calculated. The focus of Figure 14 is on real 
beneficiaries (those who receive the benefits) instead on the potential beneficiaries (all those 
families who might be entitled to). This kind of approach has clear limitations, since it 
excludes several families types that, for some reason, do not receive any kind of support from 
the state. Nevertheless, by staying focused on what the Russian welfare state really does for 
these families, one avoids guessing what it might or should do4. As Figure 14 illustrates, the 
poverty rates of FB beneficiaries constantly increased during the decade. It was 19.4% in 
1992, 22.2% in 1995, and 25.4% in 2000. Figure 14 also shows that the rate of reduction has 
been limited. The poverty rate of FB recipients without family support would indeed be of 
22.7% in 1992, of 27.6% in 1995 and of 30.8% in 2000. This means a modest reduction of 
17% in 1992, of 24% in 1995 and of 21% in 2000 (see also Table 14).    
  
                                                 
4 This kind of approach seems also to be particularly useful, since it provides a better picture of the real impact 
on the beneficiaries, while limiting several statistical distortions.   
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Fig. 14 Poverty Rate among FB Beneficiaries 
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Finally, the poverty rate among the beneficiaries of means-tested (MT) benefits is calculated 
to see the impact of the Russian basic safety net for this group of people (Fig. 15). The 
poverty rate of those who receive means-tested benefits in the Russian Federation decreased 
from 27.8% in 1992, to 12.0% in 1995, while slightly increasing to 13.9% in 2000. Although 
at first glance this might seem a remarkable result, without receiving MT benefits the poverty 
rate of this group of citizens would be “only” one-fifth higher. It would be 37.2% in 1992, 
15.0% in 1995 and 16.7% in 2000. This means again a modest reduction of 19% in 1992, of 
25% in 1995 and of 20% in 2000 (see also Table 15).  
 
Fig. 15 Poverty Rate among MT Beneficiaries 
(DPI minus MT Benefits)
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The Individualization and Monetarization of Risks in the New Russia  
The empirical evidences provided in the section above illustrate several weaknesses of the 
Russian welfare state, which demonstrates the a clear lack of ability in coping with the 
problems arising from the economic transition. What is important, however, is that the 
welfare state as an institution should not be seen as the cause of its own illness, but rather a 
wrong approach to social security that has emphasized monetarization and individualization 
of risks in times of market failures. For example, the financial crisis of 1998 and the 
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subsequent devaluation of the ruble dramatically eroded the level of savings of those workers 
who had created saving accounts for retirement (Sperling 2000). This erosion could certainly 
not have been completely avoided by state managed provisions, but, at least, responsibility 
would have shared more equally among the members of the community and the individual 
costs would consequently have consequently been greatly reduced.    
 
Another important point to stress here is that, as Manning and Tikhonova’s (2004) research 
has highlighted, poverty in Russia is negatively impacting on social networks by excluding 
poor people from a normal social life. This includes healthy and fruitful relationships with 
family members and friends, which are the basis of social capital. Numerous other studies 
have also constantly emphasized that informal mutual assistance has become crucial to 
overcome the difficult period of transition through cash and benefits in kind, but also through 
the exchange of services, information, recommendations and connections, which might be 
helpful to find a more stable job (Manning and Tikhonova 2004, p.28; Davidova 2004, p 82). 
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that alternative forms of collective assistance are emerging, 
the poor still continue to have less access to this form of social capital than any other group 
(Davidova 2004, p.82; Tikhonova 2004, pp.109-146). Thus, the saddest conclusion is that 
poverty in the new Russia still tends to have a self-perpetuating character, especially for the 
most vulnerable social groups.  
 
Conclusions 
This study has aimed to explore the relationship between poverty and social structure in 
Russia during the first decade of transition, attempting to identify the most vulnerable groups 
and to quantify the impact and efficiency of welfare institutions in preventing poverty and 
income inequality. The results lead to the conclusion that the impact of the Russian welfare 
state has been rather limited with welfare institutions having only marginally succeeded in 
reducing poverty among people in need. As far as the relationship with the household and 
labour structure is concerned, this study has also highlighted how the Russian society is now 
slowly acquiring those characteristics of differentiation present in Western societies, which 
for so many years had been advocated by the population. Unfortunately, differentiation in 
wages has also implied a dramatic and excessive differentiation in life standards and 
opportunities. These are all challenges that the Russian welfare state is called to deal with. 
The individualization and monetarization of risks are, in fact, accentuating the self-
perpetuating character of poverty, especially for those social groups explored in this paper, 
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such as children, elderly, large families with children, single mothers, farmers, manual 
workers, unemployed and social assistance beneficiaries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 Poverty Rate Total Population, Children Elderly 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
Total Population 26,0 25,7 25,6 
Children  23,6 28,8 28,9 
Elderly 49,3 26,7 24,2 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 2 Poverty Rate Disabled People DPI and MI  
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
Net Disposable Income (DPI) 45,8 28,6 34,0 
Market Income (MI) 50,4 57,5 60,8 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations 
 
 
 
Table 3 Poverty Rates Families  
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000
Small Families (1-2 Children) 20,4 26,0 27,4
Large Families (3+ Children) 35,2 43,6 38,6
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 4 Poverty Rates Elderly Single Households DPI and MI
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
Men 64,1 23,8 20,8 
Women 88,8 60,4 49,7 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 5 Poverty Rates Single Women 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
Single Women with Children 38,3 34,5 39,1 
Single Women without Children 63,1 42,6 43,0 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
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Table 6 Poverty Rates Labour Structure 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
Non manual workers 13,1 13,2 12,6 
Manual Workers 17,8 25 21,1 
Farm Workers 29,5 51,3 51,4 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 7 Average Wage/Education Level (base=100) 
Average wage by level of education 1992 1995 2000 
low 27 24 29 
medium 35 36 34 
high 38 40 37 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 8 Gender Wage Gap 
 1992 1995 2000
Gender Wage Gap 1,41 1,60 1,57
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 9 Average Wage/Occupation (base=100) 
Average wage by level of occupation 1992 1995 2000
Non Manual Workers 34 44 37 
Farm Workers 32 17 27 
Manual Workers 34 39 36 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 10 Gini Coefficient 
 1992 1995 2000 
Net Disposable Income (DPI) 0,395 0,447 0,434 
Net Disposable Income minus Social Transfers 0,43 0,504 0,497 
Change % 9% 13% 14% 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
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Table 11 Poverty Rate Total Population 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
DPI minus Social Transfers 26,0 25,7 25,6 
DPI minus Social Transfers 32,4 36,7 36,4 
Change % 25% 43% 42% 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
 
Table 12 Poverty Rate Total Population (60% of the Median) 
 DPI 
DPI minus Social 
Transfers Change % 
Austria 2000 13,6 28,2 107 
Belgium 2000 15,6 33,7 116 
Canada 2000 18 27,5 53 
Estonia 2000 19,8 34 72 
Finland 2000 12,4 25,7 107 
Germany 2000 13,2 30,9 134 
Greece 2000 21,5 30,6 42 
Hungary 1999 13,4 33,3 149 
Ireland 2000 22,7 30,5 34 
Italy 2000 19,9 29 46 
Luxembourg 2000 12,5 27,4 119 
Netherlands 1999 12,7 26,5 109 
Norway 2000 12,3 29,4 139 
Poland 1999 15,2 33,2 118 
RUSSIA 2000 25,6 36,4 42 
Slovenia 1999 14,2 29,1 105 
Spain 21,3 30,3 42 
Sweden 2000 12,3 36,1 193 
Switzerland 2000 13,5 23,7 76 
UK 1999 21,2 35,1 66 
USA 2000 23,8 28,6 20 
 
 
 
Tabe 13 Poverty Rate Unemployment Compensation Beneficiaries  
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
DPI 21,0 24,1 30,5 
DPI minus UC Benefits 33,7 29,7 38,5 
Change % 60% 23% 26% 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
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Table 14 Poverty Rate Family Benefit Beneficiaries 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
DPI 19,4 22,2 25,4 
DPI minus Family Benefits 22,7 27,6 30,8 
Change % 17% 24% 21% 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
 
Table 15 Poverty Rate Means-Tested Benefit Beneficiaries 
(60% of the Median) 
 1992 1995 2000 
DPI 27,8 12 13,9 
DPI minus Means-Tested Benefits 33,2 15 16,7 
Change % 19% 25% 20% 
Source: LIS, authors' calculations    
 
